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Theoretically as well as experimentally it is investigated how 
�ple repr·esent their knowledqe i.n oruer to make decision or. to 
share their knowledge with others. Experiment 1 probef.', into the 
ways how l=€Ople qctther infonnation c.100ut the frequencies of 
events ard how thiB knowledge is interfered with by the requested 
response mode, that is, nunerical vs. verl:nl estiootes. The le,:�st 
interference occurs if the subjects ar·e a l l owed to q.ive verbal 
responses. From this it is conch.rled t.ha.t procef3SiTYJ l<nowla:lqe 
al:out uncertainty categorically, that is, by means of verbal 
expressions, impo�'les leag mento.l work loo.d on the orgrmi::lll  thnn 
nUTler.ical processirq. 
PoE'.sibility theory is used as a framework for modellirq the 
Irdividual Uf':>ilge of verbal mteqories for qrader; of uncertainty. 
The 'ela.<Jt.ic' constraints on the verbnl expressions for every 
simle subject are determined in Experiment 2 by mecmg of 
sequential testir�. In further experiments it is shown that the 
superiority of the ved:xtl processirrr of knowledqe about 
uncertainty quite generally reduces persistent biases reported in 
the literature: conservatism (Experiment 3) ard neqliqence of 
regression (Experiment 4). In a final experiment (5) about 
predid.ions in a nx.'\1-· life sitmtion it turns out that in a 
nunerical forecastirq task subiects restricted them..co,elves to 
those p:-u:ts of their knowledge which are nutteriml . On the other 
hand subjects in a verbal forecastim task accessed verbally as 
well as nunerically stated knowledge . 
Forcast.irq is structurally related to the estirMtion of 
protxtbilities for rare events insofar aB Bt.tpportirq ard 
contradicting argunents have to be evaluated ard the choice of 
the fiml ju:igment has to be jll8tified accor:dirq to the evidence 
brought forward. In or:der to assist people in such choice 
situations a for100.l mo::lel for the interadive checkirq of 
argunents haB been developed. The mcxiel transforms the normal·· 
larqu:tge qt.nntifiers used in the argunents into fuzzy nt.moors ard 
evaluates the given train of argunents by means of fuzzy 
nunerical ot:erations. Ambiguities in the meanirq1:1 of qt.rmtifiers 
are resolved interactively. In order to force tJ1e Bubjects to 
argue consistEmtl y, al tern:1.ti ve trai m of arqunents are presente<.:t 
by the mcxlel ard the subjects are asked to iustify their choice 
of an argunentatiw� train arrl the rejection of nlterrutives. 
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Most investigations of subjective probabi l ities have been primari l y  
concerned with the procedures underlying the generation of the 
probabi l ity judgmentB (see Kahneman, S l avic & Tversky, 1982 for an 
OVfH'V i ow) . The question hoY� humans represent their know 1 edqe about 
the uncertainty of events, however, has been given very little 
attention (except for Heyna, 1 981). In most studien on sub-jl:)ctive 
probabi 1 i ty and the biases under 1 y i ng these judgments it has been 
imp l icitly assumed that the information is stor-ed symbolically (in 
this case in the numerica l mode) and that by means of retrieva l the 
numbers represent i nq the know 1 edge about uncertainty can be q i von 
immediate l y  and that there is no l oss of information between the 
accessed information and the answers given. Any inconsistency between 
information intak e (the objective side) and the numerica l l y expressed 
sub i ect i ve probab U it y ( th�) sub i ect i ve side) is then ascribed to the 
procedures applied in retrieval. That is, the subjects has presumedly 
chosen an inappropriate algorithm or heuristic in either accessinq the 
information or in deriving conc l usions from it. Examp l es for 1!.uch 
procedural fallacies are overconfidence, conservatism (i. e. sticking 
to an initial appraisa l of a situation in spite of new information 
available for revision), and negliqence of the regression effect (i.e. 
the imp l icit assumption of a perfect correlation between the predictor 
variable and the criterion). 
The approach taken here takes off by asking how the expected 
f ceq u en c J e s o f u n c e l:' t a i n eve n t s a r· e :c e p r- NJ en t e d i n tern a 11 y ( e . q . ( i ) 
in a verba l propositional mode, (ii) in a numerica l propositional 
mode, or (iii) in an analogue mode of automatic frequency monitoring). 
Coping with uncertainty is ubiquitous in humanking ( Wright and 
Phi l lips, 1980) and verbal expressions for different degrees of 
certainty can be found in most languages. Except for situations l ik e  
betting, people usual l y  handle communication about uncertainty by 
means of verbal expressions and by the implicit or explicit ru l es of 
conversation as soc ia ted with them. The research reported here 
there£ ore start from the ana 1 ysi s of the meaning of common verba 1 
expressions for uncertain events. These expressions are interpreted as 
possibi l ity functions (Zadeh, 1978) and the procedures applicab l e  to 
them (e.q. hedginq). Since this theory allows for a numerical 
interpretation by means of determining the e l astic constraints on the 
usaqe of such expressions, the resu 1 ts gained by interpreting vecba l 
expressions of uncertainty as possibility functions can be compared to 
the resu 1 ts of the above mentioned studies, where sub i ects bad to 
�xpress their judgments numerically. 
The first step in the investigation of the internal representation of 
uncertainty was to ask how people gather the k now l edge, from which by 
means of retrieval the verba 1 expressions for the probabilities of 
uncertain events are derived, One can assume that for repetitive 
events, e. g. the outcomes of bal l qames or the daily weather, people 
monitor the frequencies of outcomes automat i ca 11 y and revise their 
know l edge accordingly. Such an automatic monitorinq of freqtwncie:::; 
seems to be a p l ausible candidate for the initial mode of 
representation underlying the generation of judgments concerning 
subjective probabilities. 
In Experiment 1 it w�s attempted to determine if human observers are 
able to monitor the frequencies of more than one unattended stimulus 
attribute. It turned out that the moda l ity of the response was 
critica l for the subjects' ability to assess frequencies of events in 
the unattented stimulus attributes. The results show that (i) the 
verba l judgments were mor.e precise than the numerical ones, (ii) in 
a 11 cases the second frequency .i udgments were not as precise as the 
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first ones, but, most importantly, the impairment was less severe when 
the first iudgment was verbnl. From these results it seems plausible 
to conclude, first, that more than one unattended variable can be 
automatically monitored, but that the iudgmental precision depends on 
the mode of probing this knowledge. Second, if more than one judgment 
has to be made, there is interference between them, but the amount of 
interference depends on the modes of the judgments. The apparent 
superiority of the verbal mode leads to the tentative interpretation 
that the verbal mode for representing knowledge processes information 
more effectively than the numerical mode. If the overload of thcj 
mental processing capacity necessitates the application of heuristics, 
and if biases in human judgment can be traced back to mistaken 
applications of heuristics (for an overview see Nisbett and Ross, 
1980), the following conjecture seems plausible: Any mode of judgment 
imposing less mental work load should be more valid than one requiring 
more mental processing capacity, everything else beinq equal. 
Modelling the meanings of verbal labels for relative frequencies is 
straightforward in the framework of fuzzy set theory. The universe of 
discourse is the unit interval and the regions of applicability, 
possible a.pplico.bility, and inapplicability can be determined 
empirically, that is, the expressions are interpreted as fuzzy numbers 
in the unit interval. The resulting possibility functions for a given 
set of verbal expressions are depicted in Figure 1. The spacing 
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Fiqure L Possibility functions for a set of verba 1 expressions of 
uncertainty 
of the possibility functions is reminiscent of Witte's ( 1960) 
tt·eatment of verbal i udgments stab i 1 i zed in memory over time. Zimmer 
(1980) has shown that such equidistant and equally shaped categories 
are conversationally optimal, but it has to be kept in mind that this 
communicability constraint is a simplifying assumption, which is not a 
prerequisite for this kind of modelling. 
Experiment 2 consisted of three parts. In the first part a survey was 
taken of the verbal expressions used by the subjects for the 
description of uncertain events, in part 2 the fuzzy meanings of 
verba 1 expressions of every individual sub i ect for uncertain events 
were empirically determinea ty a modified R0bblhs-Monroe procedure and 
in part 3 these meanings were tested for calibration by comparing the 
individual subjective expectations of success in knowledge-test items 
with the actual individual probability of success as derived from the 
1-parameter logistic test model. 
The survey revealed that subjects differed in the number of verbal 
categories they spontaneously used for uncertain events. Furthermore, 
the meanings of these verbal cateqories were not the same for all 
subjects. In order to determine the fuzzy numbers in the unit interval 
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which convey the meanings of the verbal expressions, subic�cts were 
asked to judge the frequen cies of white dots in random dot patterns on 
a cr tube. The frequencies of white dots (between 5 and 95 %.) were 
changed according to the Robbins-Monroe procedure for all verbal 
expressions. 
The individual meanings (fuzzy numbers) of the verbal expressions were 
tested for calibration by giving the subjects knowledge-test items to 
solve and to ask how confident they were con c erning the correctness of 
a given answ er (this is a standard procedure, see Li c htenstein. 
Fischoff, and Phillips, 198 2 ). 
A severe problem in such calibration tasks is that individual ability 
and item difficulty are usually confounded bec ause the subiect's 
probability estimate is judged against the relative frequency of the 
q r· o up t he sub j e c t i n a member o E • I n order to s e par:· ate the v a r i a b l e s 
'diffi culty of the item' and 'ability of the suh:iect', both of which 
influen ce the probabilities of correct answers, the conioint­
measurement approa ch of Rasch (1966) is applied, whi ch provides 
independent entimates of the abi li t y o f  a s ubject, �·t, and the 
diffi culty of an item j1 Oj. These estimateB in turn allow for an 
assessment of the probability that subject i solves item J, a c cording 
to the following formula: 
1 (_·. -o. + e "> ' .j 
Figure 2 gives the diffi culty-by-label curves for all subjects using 
cum� f. 
0 item di.fficulty 
Fiqure 2. The averaqe cumulative difficulty -·· by -label curves for all 
subjects applying five expressions for their subjec tive 
probobi . li ties of su c ce:;ses, and the nstimated numeri cal 
values 
five labels (n::S7). The curves are 
values of the possibility functions 
expressions) ar.e in good agreement 
from the model. 
fairly parallel and the median 
(ranges of applicability for the 
with the probabilities estimated 
A typical example for suboptimal information processing has been 
demonstrated in experiments on conservatism, where subiects tend to 
stic k  to their initial assumptions c on c erning the probability of 
events despJ. te the E act that in the light of new i nf ormation they 
should revise these assumptions. The optimal revision strategy for 
estimates in this task is the appli c ation of Bayes' theorem, whic h  
therefore can be used a s  a normative standard for the subjec ts' 
performance. In a series of experiments Phillips and Edwards (1966) 
have investigated this phenomenon with the result that in all cases 
conservatism o c c ured. This effe ct could be slightly reduc ed by 
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relievinq thE:� memo:cy load of the .sub.iect.s and :in one condition by 
permitting them to answer verbally. 
In a replication experiment of Phillips' & Edwards' experiment Ill 
with a ratio of 70:30 expected SlJccesses in the two bins, one group of 
subjects was requested to use verbal descriptions and the second group 
to use numerical estimate :J , Tho difference to Ph illi p�> & Edwards' 
procedure, howevE�r. was that the verbal as well as the numerical 
descri pt i ons had been calibrated individually according to the 
procedure of the 8econd experiment. T'h<.1t is, the responses had been 
interpreted as fuzzy numbers with elastic constraints. 
The nH.lultB of the verbal and of the numerical judgments plus t.ho::w 
from Ph i 1 1  i p s and Ed war· d s ( '1 9 6 6 , Ex per i me n t I I I ) are shown i n �· i g u r e 
3. These results clearly indicate that verbal responses induce near 
2.0 
BQ-eeie perf. 1.0 
� 
�rt==�·�-==--.:::��"'-· ··· .... 
o���-r���rT����� 10 no. o! trials 
t'iqure 3. Comparison of Phillips & Edwards results (broken 
the results from individually calibrated verbal 
(unbroken line) and individually calibrated 
responses (dotted line). 
J.irw) with 
responses 
numeri c al 
o p t i m a 1 , or Bayes i an , per for..· m a n c e i n the sub i e c b3. r n contrast , t tw 
calibrated numerical judqment are only slightly better than the 
results of Phil ips & Edwards . In the liqht of this result one can 
as�:tume that the so call ed conservatism in information processing is 
not due to an improper pro c essing of the information provided but that 
it is due to the difficulties subjects have in storing and processing 
numerical expressions. Thus, it is not the perception of reality that 
is biased, but it is the mode of expressing one's knowledge about 
reality. 
A second prototypical example for people's difficulties in handlinq 
uncertainty can be found in the prediction of uncertain events, 
Kahneman & Tversky ( 19'73) studied categorical as well as numerical 
predictions and found that in a 1 1  cases subjects tended to neglect 
the base rates and exhibited mistaken intuitions about regression For 
instance, they acted as if in all cases the correlation between the 
predictor variable and the criterion was perfect and as if the 
predictor variable was measured with perfect reliability. 
In Experiment 4 subjects were asked to predict the individual success 
of students at the university from their performance in highschool. In 
order to let subjects develop their notion of the correlational 
re lat i onshi p between highschool and college performance, they were 
given a sample of 75 typical cases of grades students received at 
h ighschoo 1 and in the gn1duat i ng exam at the university. Afterwards 
they had to predict the performance at the university of 50 students 
on the basis of their highschool grades. The results were very similar 
to those obtained by Kahneman and Tversky (1973) but when the subjects 
were asked how certain they were about the correctness of their 
predictions, they gave quite 1 ow subjective degrees of confi dence. 
221 
When probed further about the direction of their probable error of 
pr-ediction 27 out of JO s ub j e cts indicated correctly tha t the true 
value would probably be closer to the mean performance than they had 
predicted . 
This result as well as those reported above seem to indicate that. 
subjects are better able to take into account complex dependencies by 
means of verbal processing than i£ they are forced to process the same 
amount of information numerically. As Gregory (1982) points out, 
numbers and computation form a more recent tool of mind than language 
and therefore the numerical information processing is less automatic. 
In experiment 5 subjects ( 2 4  hank clerks responsible for foreign 
exchange) were asked to predict what the exchange rate between the (JS 
Dollar and the Deutschmark would be four weeks later. Twelve subjects 
had to give the predictions ''in their own words as they would talk to 
a client", whereas the other twelve werf� asked to give numerical 
estimates in percentage of change, Both groups were asked to verbalize 
the steps they took in order to come up with the prediction. After the 
pr.edictiorw of the f:lr:-st qroup had boen crilibrated with a technique 
similar to that used in Experiment 2, they were compared to the 
predicti onn made by the numerical foreca�3tinq qroup. It turned out 
that the first group was more correct and more internally consistent. 
While this is i ntere stinq in itself, another- point is more imp ortant : 
The slight difference in the instructions caused marked differences in 
the �•ay the sub j ects porformed their task as r- eve aled by tho verbol 
protocol. The verbal predi ction group used quantitative variables 
Co. q. the GNP i ncr 8 o.se in percent) as we 11 as qualitat i ve var iab 1 es 
(e.g. the stability of the German government) for deriving their 
pr:ed i. ct i o ns, whereas the· othet� qroup mere 1 y took into account t hose 
variables which are usually expressed numerically. From this it seems 
plausible to assume that one reason for the superiority in the ver bal 
forecasting condition is the fact that the knowledge base on which 
·thes e sub i ects re 1 i ed was broade r and a 11 o wed for more elaboration. 
However, it has to be kept in mind that the heuristic of causal 
.schemata can be also misleading; Nisbett & Ross (1980) r-eport ample 
evidence for the deleterious effects of misinterpreting diagnostic 
information as causal. The major difference between the studies 
reported in Nisbett & Ross (1980) and this experiment lies in the fact 
that the bank cler-ks were a c tivel y searchinq for information and only 
implemented their own knowledge into their reasoning. 
The studies of Begq (1982), Zimmer (1982, in pr-ess), as well as the 
theoretical analysis of "rational belief" by Kyburg (1983) indicate 
that de scribing human reasoning in the framework of classical loqic 
might be a mistaken approach. The proposed alternative starts from the 
assumption that peo pl e usually start with making a claim about a given 
problem (e.g. the estimation of the probability of a rare event). 
A ft erwards they justify this claim by giving the underlying train of 
arguments and the available evidence favorable for the claim. Counter­
arguments and/or contracting evidence forces them either to revise the 
claim or to refute the argumentative alternatives. 
We are devel oping a mode l which helps the decision maker to check the 
arguments by which he or she backs or justifies the claim made. A 
special kind of justifications are those with explicit (e.g. "Oft�n. X 
is influenced by Y") or. implicit quantification (e.g. "Xs prevail if 
Y"). I f  the meaning of the quantifier ar unambiquous, it is 
represented as a fuzzy number in the interval ro, 100 %] giving the 
expected proportion of positive incidences of X (see Zadeh, 1984; 
Zimmer, 198 4 ). In the case of ambiguous quantifiers (e.g. "usually") 
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the meaning is interactively rendered so precise that the qu�ntifie� 
can be expressed as a single fuzzy number (see Figure 4). 
Expert's 
response 
,. 
usually ::> 
0 
Figure 4. 
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Search for 
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determination of the meaning 
( indicates trans l at ion) . 
.:> very often 
:> quite often 
:> JllJre often 
than not 
� :oonnally 
�practically 
always 
of an intended 
For a final evaluation these local interpretations of argumentative 
proposi t i ons are propagated and it is checked how and if the reasons 
given are backed by factual knowledge (e.q. "On which observable 
instctncE)S do you base the stct ement 'X'?") and how r·eliabJ.e and 
generalizable these supporting facts are. After all the components of 
the arr:rument have been e 1 i cited nnd after the meaning of the u8ed 
predicates and the credibility of the ground, the warrant, the 
back i nq, and o f  rebuttals (Toulmin, Rieke & Janik, t9'79) have been 
determined, the credibility of the claim is analytically derived from 
t hese valLHlS by means of fuzzy sylloqistic reasoninq (Zadeh, t984; 
Zimmer, 1984 ). The credibility values are either transformed into 
verbal exprensions (e.g. 'li kely', 'unprobable' etc., see Z1.mmer., 
1983) or are given in their original numerical form together with the 
elastic constraints. If the subjective evaluation of the claim by the 
deci.sion maker and the analytical evaluation are about the same, the 
intera ct i ve process ends. If, however, the expert disagrees, he or she 
is asked to give further grounds or to revise the credibility ratings 
for the facts given. 
The interactive model for the elucidation of arguments underlying the 
claims (e.q. predictions, diaqnoses) of experts on the on hand serves 
as a mean.s for an unbiased probability asses.sment for claims. Insofar 
it resembles the procedure proposed by Henrion and Morgan (see Morgan, 
in press). On the other hand, however, it makes explicit the knowledge 
base on which the expert grounds his/her claim. The comparison of the 
knowledge bases underlying the predictions of different experts for 
the same evt:nt shows if these predictions are ba.sed on more or less 
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same reasons or not. In the first case an agglommeration of the 
evaluations made by different experts is admissible. In the other 
case, however, only those judgments can be pooled which are based on 
comparable knowledge bases. 
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